

# Chapter 8

# Security

---


## A note on the use of these ppt slides:

We're making these slides freely available to all (faculty, students, readers). They're in PowerPoint form so you see the animations; and can add, modify, and delete slides (including this one) and slide content to suit your needs. They obviously represent a lot of work on our part. In return for use, we only ask the following:

- ❖ If you use these slides (e.g., in a class) that you mention their source (after all, we'd like people to use our book!)
- ❖ If you post any slides on a www site, that you note that they are adapted from (or perhaps identical to) our slides, and note our copyright of this material.

Thanks and enjoy! JFK/KWR

© All material copyright 1996-2012  
J.F. Kurose and K.W. Ross, All Rights Reserved



Computer  
Networking: A Top  
Down Approach  
6<sup>th</sup> edition  
Jim Kurose, Keith Ross  
Addison-Wesley  
March 2012

# What is network security?

***confidentiality:*** only sender, intended receiver should “understand” message contents

- sender encrypts message
- receiver decrypts message

***authentication:*** sender, receiver want to confirm identity of each other


***message integrity:*** sender, receiver want to ensure message not altered (in transit, or afterwards) without detection

***access and availability:*** services must be accessible and available to users

# Socket programming

**goal:** learn how to build client/server applications that communicate using sockets

**socket:** door between application process and end-end-transport protocol



# Socket programming

*Two socket types for two transport services:*

- **UDP:** unreliable datagram
- **TCP:** reliable, byte stream-oriented

*Application Example:*

1. Client reads a line of characters (data) from its keyboard and sends the data to the server.
2. The server receives the data and converts characters to uppercase.
3. The server sends the modified data to the client.
4. The client receives the modified data and displays the line on its screen.

# Socket programming *with TCP*

## client must contact server

- ❖ server process must first be running
- ❖ server must have created socket (door) that welcomes client's contact

## client contacts server by:

- ❖ Creating TCP socket, specifying IP address, port number of server process
- ❖ *when client creates socket:* client TCP establishes connection to server TCP

- ❖ when contacted by client, *server TCP creates new socket* for server process to communicate with that particular client
  - allows server to talk with multiple clients
  - source port numbers used to distinguish clients


## application view point:

TCP provides reliable, in-order byte-stream transfer (“pipe”) between client and server

# Client/server socket interaction: TCP

server (running on `hostid`)


client




# SSL: Secure Sockets Layer

- ❖ widely deployed security protocol
  - supported by almost all browsers, web servers
  - https
  - billions \$/year over SSL
- ❖ mechanisms: [Woo 1994], implementation: Netscape
- ❖ variation -TLS: transport layer security, RFC 2246
- ❖ provides
  - *confidentiality*
  - *integrity*
  - *authentication*
- ❖ original goals:
  - Web e-commerce transactions
  - encryption (especially credit-card numbers)
  - Web-server authentication
  - optional client authentication
  - minimum hassle in doing business with new merchant
- ❖ available to all TCP applications
  - secure socket interface

# SSL and TCP/IP



*normal application*



*application with SSL*


- ❖ SSL provides application programming interface (API) to applications
- ❖ C and Java SSL libraries/classes readily available



# Toy SSL: a simple secure channel

- ❖ *handshake*: Alice and Bob use their certificates, private keys to authenticate each other and exchange shared secret
- ❖ *key derivation*: Alice and Bob use shared secret to derive set of keys
- ❖ *data transfer*: data to be transferred is broken up into series of records
- ❖ *connection closure*: special messages to securely close connection

# Toy: a simple handshake



**MS:** master secret

**EMS:** encrypted master secret

# Toy: key derivation

- ❖ considered bad to use same key for more than one cryptographic operation
  - use different keys for message authentication code (MAC) and encryption
- ❖ four keys:
  - $K_c$  = encryption key for data sent from client to server
  - $M_c$  = MAC key for data sent from client to server
  - $K_s$  = encryption key for data sent from server to client
  - $M_s$  = MAC key for data sent from server to client
- ❖ keys derived from key derivation function (KDF)
  - takes master secret and (possibly) some additional random data and creates the keys

# Toy: data records

- ❖ why not encrypt data in constant stream as we write it to TCP?
  - where would we put the MAC? If at end, no message integrity until all data processed.
  - e.g., with instant messaging, how can we do integrity check over all bytes sent before displaying?
- ❖ instead, break stream in series of records
  - each record carries a MAC
  - receiver can act on each record as it arrives
- ❖ issue: in record, receiver needs to distinguish MAC from data
  - want to use variable-length records



# Toy: sequence numbers

- ❖ *problem*: attacker can capture and replay record or re-order records
- ❖ *solution*: put sequence number into MAC:
  - $MAC = MAC(M_x, \text{sequence}||\text{data})$
  - note: no sequence number field
- ❖ *problem*: attacker could replay all records
- ❖ *solution*: use nonce

# Toy: control information


- ❖ *problem*: truncation attack:
  - attacker forges TCP connection close segment
  - one or both sides thinks there is less data than there actually is.
- ❖ *solution*: record types, with one type for closure
  - type 0 for data; type 1 for closure
- ❖  $MAC = MAC(M_x, \text{sequence} || \text{type} || \text{data})$



# Toy SSL: summary



*encrypted*



bob.com

# Toy SSL isn't complete

- ❖ how long are fields?
- ❖ which encryption protocols?
- ❖ want negotiation?
  - allow client and server to support different encryption algorithms
  - allow client and server to choose together specific algorithm before data transfer



# SSL cipher suite

- ❖ cipher suite
  - public-key algorithm
  - symmetric encryption algorithm
  - MAC algorithm
- ❖ SSL supports several cipher suites
- ❖ negotiation: client, server agree on cipher suite
  - client offers choice
  - server picks one

## common SSL symmetric ciphers

- DES – Data Encryption Standard: block
- 3DES – Triple strength: block
- RC2 – Rivest Cipher 2: block
- RC4 – Rivest Cipher 4: stream

## SSL Public key encryption

- RSA

# Real SSL: handshake (I)

## *Purpose*

1. server authentication
2. negotiation: agree on crypto algorithms
3. establish keys
4. client authentication (optional)

# Real SSL: handshake (2)

1. client sends list of algorithms it supports, along with client nonce
2. server chooses algorithms from list; sends back: choice + certificate + server nonce
3. client verifies certificate, extracts server's public key, generates pre\_master\_secret, encrypts with server's public key, sends to server
4. client and server independently compute encryption and MAC keys from pre\_master\_secret and nonces
5. client sends a MAC of all the handshake messages
6. server sends a MAC of all the handshake messages

# Real SSL: handshaking (3)


last 2 steps protect handshake from tampering

- ❖ client typically offers range of algorithms, some strong, some weak
- ❖ man-in-the middle could delete stronger algorithms from list
- ❖ last 2 steps prevent this
  - last two messages are encrypted

# Real SSL: handshaking (4)

- ❖ why two random nonces?
- ❖ suppose Trudy sniffs all messages between Alice & Bob
- ❖ next day, Trudy sets up TCP connection with Bob, sends exact same sequence of records
  - Bob (Amazon) thinks Alice made two separate orders for the same thing
  - solution: Bob sends different random nonce for each connection. This causes encryption keys to be different on the two days
  - Trudy's messages will fail Bob's integrity check

# SSL record protocol




*record header*: content type; version; length

*MAC*: includes sequence number, MAC key  $M_x$

*fragment*: each SSL fragment  $2^{14}$  bytes (~16 Kbytes)

# SSL record format




data and MAC encrypted (symmetric algorithm)

# Real SSL connection



*everything  
henceforth  
is encrypted*



**TCP FIN follows**



# Key derivation

- ❖ client nonce, server nonce, and pre-master secret input into pseudo random-number generator.
  - produces master secret
- ❖ master secret and new nonces input into another random-number generator: “key block”
  - because of resumption: TBD
- ❖ key block sliced and diced:
  - client MAC key
  - server MAC key
  - client encryption key
  - server encryption key
  - client initialization vector (IV)
  - server initialization vector (IV)